Impact of the third package of air transport liberalization measures. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. COM (96) 514 final, 22 October 1996 by unknown
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 22.10.1996 
COM(96) 514  final 
COMMUNICATION FROM TilE COMMISSION 
TO THE COUNCIL AND TilE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
IMPACT OF THE THIRD PACKAGE  OF 
AIR TRANSPORT LIBERALIZATION MEASURES GENERAL EVALUATION AND FOLLOW-UP 
Libcralisation  of civil  avwt10n  in  Europe  was  established  between  1993-96.  Certain 
experts believe that three years is too short a period to carry out an objective evaluation 
of its impact.. However, with only six months before the complete liberalization of the 
market, with unrestricted  cabotage, the Commission feels it necessary to  present a first 
evaluation. 
The fact, which certainly hits the average traveller, is that the single aviation market  has 
not occurred with a "Big Bang": there has been no spectacular reduction in the fares,  nor 
any dramatic disappearance of the more important carriers, nor a substantial penetration 
of the  domestic  markets  by  foreign  competitors.  Liberalization  has  happened  in  a 
progressive  way  and  without  major upsets.  This  contrasts  with  the  situation  that  the 
United States experienced at the time of the deregulation of the  aviation  market.  The 
Community has found the correct balance between competition and control mechanisms. 
Competition and consumer have both benefitted. 
The  effects  of this  process,  although  slow,  are  nevertheless  quite  clear  and  it  is 
satisfactory  to  note  that  in  the  end  almost  all  operators  have  made  usc  of the  new 
possibilities offered by the third package. 
For example, when the third package was introduced there were 490 routes, there arc now 
approximately  520.  This  increase  contrasts  with  the  situation  which  prevailed  in  the 
United States.  30% of the  Community routes arc  served by two  operators and  6% by 
three operators or more. It should be noted that out of the 64% of routes operated as a 
monopoly a large number of them have low levels of traffic and  are of no  interest to 
most other  carriers.  Furthermore a certain number of the  other routes experience real 
competition from  neighbouring  routes,  from  charter services or from  other  modes of 
transport. One of most interesting developments certainly is the fact that the number of 
operators, on a significant number of  domestic routes, passed from one to two. Moreover, 
the dominant carrier's market share often fell to the advantage of the second carrier. The 
possibilities of access to the market have been used: there· are now 30 routes operated on 
a 5th freedom basis as  opposed to  14  in January  1993;  routes operated with cabotage 
traffic grew from 0 in 1993  to  20 today. The public service obligations have been used 
on a  hundred  routes  in  Ireland,  Sweden,  the  United  Kingdom,  Portugal,  France  and 
Norway.  · 
Capacity increased but did not reduce the load factors in an unacceptable way. It  is  certainly in respect of the creation of new airlines that market dynamics have been 
most visible.  Over the three years 800 licences has been granted, the majority going to 
small operators  :80 companies has  been created,  for  the  most part  private companies, 
while 60 have disappeared. Increased competition from the charter companies on regular 
routes should also be highlighted. More important, new entrants appeared on the markets 
of  the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Greece, Austria 
and Belgium. Their entry into the market -has often contributed to  a fall  in the fares. 
The downside of liberalisation is that the fall in air fares hus been felt only on the routes 
where  competition has  been fully  realised i.e.  where more than two  airlines operate. 
Certain categories of fares have fallen significantly on routes such as Barcelona/Madrid, 
UK!Ireland, Paris/London, certain domestic routes in Germany, in France, in Italy, in UK 
and in Belgium towards a number of European destinations. In general, the structure of 
the fares on scheduled flights remains complex and sometimes seems  non-transparent 
thus preventing  the users from  benefiting from the competition. 
If the third package has been implemented in  1993 and 1994  because of the economic 
recession,  the  pace  has accelerated  since  1995  and  1996  and results  arc  encouraging. 
However, it is clear that, if the "foundations" of liberalization have been well established, 
much still remains to be done to make it a complete success. 
Four grey areas can be identified: 
Air Fares 
Liberalization is not an end in itself. The opening of the markets is only meaningful if 
the increased competition brings to the consumer better goods and services at lower costs. 
Expected beneficial effects of competition on fares has not materialised. An impressive 
number of  promotional fares has developed and the share ofthe passengers  travelling on 
scheduled flights with tickets at reduced prices has passed from 60.5% in 1985 to 70.9% 
in  1995  and,  taking  into  account  that  the  share  of the  charter  market  accounts  for 
approximately 50-55% of the total market, it is estimated that 85-90% of the passengers 
travel at reduced prices.  A sharp drop, of almost 20%, of the yield also confirms this 
tendency. However, these tickt::ts  are often accompanied by restrictions with regards to 
schedules  flexibility  and  arc  available  only  for  a  limited  number of seats.  The new 
distribution  techniques  (Internet  etc)  should  facilitate  access  to  these  fares  by  the 
individual traveller: however, the existence of  these techniques must be known and access 
to them must be established. The Commission is examining ways of informing the public 
on  this  subject  to  ensure  the  necessary  transparency  for  the  consumer  and  to  avoid 
differences in tariffs which cannot be justified on objective grounds. 
In contrast to  the promotional fares  most of the fully  flexible  fares  have continued to 
increase.  On  certain  routes  these  fares  can  be  described  as  excessive.  A  detailed 
examination will consequently be necessary in order to pinpoint the cases of excessive 
fares under Regulation 2409/92 and the rules of competition. Where necessary  the 
ll  lb Commission will  use the  powers of enquiry conferred by  this regulation  to  put an end 
to  excessively  high  fares.  The  Commission could  in  certain  cases  examine  potential 
abuses of dominant position under Article 86 of the Treaty. 
Capacity restrictions 
It would be unrealistic to seek to  liberalize civil aviation in Europe, with the consequent 
increase  in  traffic,  without envisaging adjustments to  the  capacity available.  In  recent 
years the majority of airports have had  to  re-examine their development plans, both as 
regards capacity of terminals and usc of runways. Similar problems exist with air traffic 
control,  where  the  fragmentation  of the  European airspace  continues  to  pose  serious 
management problems. The Commission is  active in these areas: 
c  As  regards  airports,  the  Commission  has  just  conducted  a  series  of 
consultations on the question of slot allocation. In the light of these discussions 
it  will present,  during  the  last quarter of 1996,  a proposal  for  amendments  to 
Regulation 95/93.  One of the objectives sought by the system of slot allocation 
is  to allow optimum use of capacity while encouraging increased competition. 
c With regard to air traffic control, the Commission published in March a White 
Paper on "the management of air traffic". One of the fundamental ideas proposed 
by this document  is to guarantee that common rules apply at the widest possible 
European level  and cover the  largest possible  geographical space  in  order to 
abolish  the  artificial  capacity  restrictions  connected  with  the 
administrative/political parcelling out of the airspace. 
The costs of air transport 
When the aim of liberalization is to give operators more choice and provide users with 
better services at competitive prices,  it is  necessary to examine the costs.  It has been 
estimated that infrastructure charges alone account for 25%  of  total  operational costs 
these are believed to  be 40%  higher than  in the  United States.  These costs  not only 
concern air traffic control but also  airport fees and ground handling: 
c  A directive on the liberalization of ground handling has  been adopted by the 
Council on October  15  this  year.  The  aim is  to  open  the market for ground 
handling and  should,  in the long term,  reduce  prices for these services. 
l1l  t  c. c  With regards to  air traffic management, the aim of the above mentioned White 
Paper is to  improve service levels and recommends the separation of  regulatory 
activities  from  the  provision  of services  to  the  users.  This  should  give  more 
freedom  to  the  airlines  and  reduce  costs.  Indeed  until  now  the  system  of air 
traffic management  has been such that the A  TM service providers are not at all 
encouraged to  seck the best cost/effectiveness ratio.  Decentralized services will 
encourage rigorous management and a better control of the costs. 
c  Lastly,  as  regards  airport fees,  the  Commission plans  to  submit a  proposal 
before  the  end  ()f  1996.  It  will  be  based  on  three  major  principles: 
non-discrimination,  transparency and cost effectiveness. 
Access to the market 
The internal market remains fragile in sofar as  it remains incomplete External relations 
continue to be subject to  bilateral agreements between the Community Member States 
and non-member countries.  These agreements always  contain provisions  incompatible 
with the  internal market,  such as  the nationality clauses,  and their existence is  partly 
responsible  for  the  loss  of competitive pressure  on the  Community market,  it  is  to 
preserve the internal aviation market and to be in a position to control the impact that 
the  bilateral  agreements  can  have  on  the  Community  market  that  the  Commission 
proposes  negotiations with  third countries.  Based  in part on such considerations,  the 
Council has  granted a  Community negotiating brief with the  United States  in several 
fields.  The  Council  has  granted  a  negotiating  brief with  the  associated  countries  of 
Central Europe. 
The effects on competition of the alliances,  which have increased rapidly,  can only  be 
appreciated on a case by case basis.  Certain of these alliances have  ended fairly quickly 
whilst others arc too recent  to evaluate.  Nevertheless their  association with the practice 
of code-sharing,  coupled with the frequent  flyer programmes,  can cause a number of 
difficulties in respect of access  to the market for the small operators who arc not in a 
position to cope with such  dominant positions. Similarly by using such practices, certain 
non Community carriers c.an  overcome the barriers of entry to the Community market 
by  making usc of the  services of a Community carrier which is  permitted to  operate 
without restrictions  between Community  airport  to  the  detriment of certain Member 
States.  These  practices  merit examination by  the  Commission  under the competition 
rules. 
lV We  have seen above that  public service obligations (PSO)  have been used  frequently. 
It will be advisable to  check that PSOs do not become a disguised means of restricting 
the  market.  In this  context  the  Commission  will  have  to  ensure  that  the  provisions 
concerning PSOs arc carefully monitored. 
Access to the market will only be completely liberalized  in April  1997,  when the  last 
restrictions on cabotage traffic are removed.  However,  it is prudent, as of now ,to take 
the necessary measures,  as described above, in order to prevent obstacles for access to 
the market being retained.  There  are still  numerous routes which arc not operated, or 
are  operated with low traffic densities,  where the  lack of competition provides  very 
good opportunities for a new carrier to  take advantage.  The Community market is  not 
yet  optimal:  its  restructuring  is  on  going  privatizations  continue.  During  this 
restructuring exercise, it will be the Commission's role to ensure that  competition rules 
continue to be applied rigourlously  With the  completion of the single aviation market 
in 1997  "the Commission will  not be able  to  authorize restructuring  aid  unless under 
very stringent conditions" 
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The Commission is also conscious of the potential implications of the  liberalisation of 
air  transport  on employment.  In this  context,  a  study  of the  social  impact  of the 
liberalisation of air transport is  underway 
Lastly,  and although it is  not the purpose of this analysis,  it is  important to  recall that 
improvements in the Community aviation system  will have to be accompanied by  more 
stringent safety measures  and better consideration of the environment.  Proposals  will 
be tabled to this end. 
with regard to this, see the guidelines of the Commission on the Application of 
articles 92 and 93 of  the Treaty and article 61  of  the EE.A agreement to state aids 
in the aviation sector (OJ C 350 du 10.12.94) 
v  te INTRODUCTION 
On  1  January  1993,  the  third  package  of  measures  for  the  liberalization  of the 
Community's  air  transport  market  entered  into  force.  The  aim  of the  liberalization 
policy, which began in 1987, is the gradual creation of a truly single market based upon 
the freedom to provide services throughout the Community in accordance with a single 
set of rules. 
The third package consists of the following elements : 
common rules on the licensing of air carriers,  laid down in Council Regulation 
(EEC)  No 2407/92
1
; 
rules  on access for Community air carriers to  intra-Community air routes,  laid 
down in Council Regulation (EEC) No 2408/921; 
rules on fares  and rates for intra-Community air services,  laid down in Council 
Regulation (EEC)  No 2409/92
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; 
the  full  application of the competition rules  of the Treaty  to  the  liberalized air 
transport market in accordance with Council Regulations (EEC) No 3975/87 and 
(EEC) No 3976/87 (as amended)1• 
As of 1 July 1994, the third package is also fully applicable within the framework of the 
Agreement  establishing  the  European  Economic  Area  (EEA),  thus  further  including 
Norway and Iceland. 
Article 13  of  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2408/92  and  Article  9  of Regulation  (EEC) 
No 2409/92 oblige the Commission to publish a report on the application of those two 
Regulations by 1 July  1994 and periodically thereafter.  In June 1994, the Commission 
adopted a communication entitled "The way forward for civil aviation in Europe"2•  In 
the meantime, a number of major factual and legal developments have occurred which 
necessitated  the drawing-up of a more  detailed report on the  functioning  of the third 
package.  This  report  is  based  on the  experience  acquired  by  the  Commission  with 
regard to the functioning of the internal air transport market from 1 January  1993 until 
1 January  1996. 
Nevertheless,  the  findings  are  sufficient  to  show  that  the  liberalization  process  is 
producing a significant number of positive results without the instability that some may 
have feared.  Market access possibilities are being used.  New routes and services are 
being created.  On some of the most heavily travelled routes, new entrants are bringing 
competitive pressure to bear on traditional duopolies.  Indeed the number of European 
companies offering regular service is increasing substantially and most are now privately 
owned.  The market  share of the  dominant so-called  flag  carriers has also  fallen 
OJ L 249 of 28.8.1992 
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COM(94) 218 final. noticeably.  The charter market continues to grow.  Alliances and partnerships are being 
formed.  Carriers  have taken advantage of new opportunities.  After several loss-making 
years,  most carriers regained their profitability in 1995.  As to fares,  on average  prices 
arc beginning to fall,  with particularly notable reductions where more than two carriers 
arc competing on the same route.  The full liberalization of cabotage in 1997 should give 
further impetus to  the process. 
On the other hand, as yet, many routes continue to be served by monopolies or duopolies 
and in those circumstances significant  consumer benefits have not appeared.  In some 
cases this situation is attributable to limits on capacity in congested airports but in others 
such  constraints  arc  not  present,  suggesting  that  the  full  benefits  of the  present 
liberalization regime have yet to be realized.  Also the ability of carriers to exploit the 
full potential of the internal aviation market is constrained by limitations on access to the 
ground handling market, producing high costs and inadequate service and is also affected 
by  the  diverse  bilateral  arrangements  maintained  between  Member  States  and  third 
countries.  Finally, while the development of alliances and partnerships  may in part be 
positive,  it  also  involves  the  risk  of,  if taken  too  far,  limiting  competition  to  the 
disadvantage of the consumer. 
In brief, the third package is already bringing considerable benefits to the aviation sector 
and the consumer and shows potential for the realisation of further benefits in coming 
years.  At the same time, the process is  far from complete and is subject to constraints, 
actual and potential,  which need  to  be  effectively addressed  if the  full  benefits of the 
process are to be realized. 
2 Impact of the third package of air transport liberalization measures 
The third package of air transport liberalization measures has  had  a definite impact on 
the Community air transport market.  However, the changes brought about have not been 
sudden or spectacular, due partly to the fact that the liberalization process itself got under 
way initially  in a  period of economic recession.  Some were  a long  time coming (the 
major developments on domestic markets did not happen until1995, for example), while 
others had occurred well before 1993 (alliances, capacity increases,  etc.). The fact that 
the  third  package  got off to  a  slow  and,  at  times,  patchy  start  - coupled  with  the 
extremely  short period covered by  this  study  - frequently  makes  the  task  of analysis 
difficult, all the more so as  it is  sometimes hard to distinguish the direct consequences 
of the third package from actions or measures  that would have come about anyway in 
view of  current international developments (globalization, alliances, etc.).  Furthermore, 
while it is true that the charter sector is carrying more passengers, the data available arc 
scanty.  For this  reason,  certain results  need to be  interpreted with caution just as,  by 
the same token, certain conclusions cannot yet be regarded as  definitive. 
I.  FARES 
The rules and their application 
The principle of price freedom  for Community air carriers on intra-Community  air routes was 
established under Articles 3 and 5(1) of Regulation (EEC) No  2409/92.  Consequently, 
Member States arc no longer allowed  to subject air fares  to  the requirement of prior 
authorization.  This freedom  has advantages just as  much for the scheduled carriers as  for the 
charter flight operators. 
Articles 6(1), 7(1) and 7(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 2409/92 allow, on the one hand,  the 
Member States,  under certain conditions, either to withdraw an excessively  high basic fare  or 
to stop an excessive downward spiral  in air fares,  while at  the same time empowering  the 
Commission to examine,  at the request of a Member State or on the basis of a complaint,  the 
legality of any action taken by the national civil aviation authorities under Article 6(1).  So far, 
neither the Member States nor the Commission have used their powers under the Regulation. 
As  far as  the evolution of tariffs is  concerned,  the Commission has  deemed  it appropriate, 
however,  to draw up guidelines which it can use in the future,  as  and when it is called upon to 
exercise  its powers. 
For the air traveller, the most tangible aspect of air transport liberalization in Europe is 
unquestionably its impact on fares.  This new freedom was demonstrated in spectacular 
fashion just one day after the introduction of the internal air transport market, when right 
at the beginning of 1993 Lufthansa offered the European market a very simplified range 
of  fares  (3  levels)  to  all  European  destinations.  Although  it  lasted  only  until 
31  March 1993, the scheme had a dramatic impact in that it marked the beginning of a 
new phase in European fares competition. 
1.  Observation of the market in general 
Contrary to what happened in the United States in the wake of air transport deregulation, 
there have been no across-the-board or high-profile fare reductions in Europe.  Instead, 
3 the  European  airlines  have  preferred  to  pursue  a  more  selective  policy  introducing, 
alongside the thousands of official rates  laid down in the lATA conferences, their own 
prices under their code with their own restrictions and periods of validity. 
Fare categories 
Three categories of fares  are available on the European market: 
- the most  flexible  fares,  also called  full  fares,  which arc  the  no-restriction economy  fares, 
business fares  and first-class  fares; 
- promotional fares  (APEX, PEX, etc.); 
- special fares  (special  offers for limited periods). 
In the European market  the proportion of passengers  travelling on scheduled  flights  with cut-price 
tickets  rose from 60.5% in 1985 to 70.9% in 1995.  Allowing for the fact  that the charter market 
accounts  for some 50 to 55% of the total market,  it  is  reasonable  to assume that 90 to 95% of 
passengers arc currently travelling at  reduced  fares.  The acceleration  in this decline can be  traced 
back to the end of 1991  and is  due, on the one hand, to  the overcapacity  on the market and, on the 
other, to the effects of the competition rules and the Community provisions liberalizing fares. 
According to the AEA there was a constant and gradual  fall  in yield in  Europe by  about 20% 
between  1991  and  199 5. 
The market has been characterized by a proliferation of promotional offers and special 
fares  for limited periods,  which usually have the effect of complementing,  rather than 
modifying,  the  existing  fares  structure.  These  fares  are  fed  into  the  Computerized 
Reservation System (CRS) virtually in real time, since prior authorization by the national 
authorities is no longer required.  It is  to be hoped that the new distribution techniques 
(Internet, etc.) will make it easier for the average traveller to obtain the best bargains. 
However, these fares  arc subject to considerable restrictions,  and the number of seats 
offered  at  these  prices,  by the major carriers  at least,  is  often limited.  Within this 
special-offer market, one has to distinguish between two types of competitor: the large 
airlines,  which compete with each other on markets or routes with equivalent services 
and frequencies, and offer a wide range of fares with some seats offered at special prices 
as  a function of yield management, and the other airlines,  which compensate for their 
limited services and/or frequencies  with genuinely attractive prices  applying to all the 
scats  sold.  Examples of this  second category are  EuroBelgian
3  and Ryanair; both of 
which offer a limited service but at very competitive prices. 
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from September 1996 Virgin Express 
4 Return fares  Jan.  January  1995  July  1995 
(in BF)  from  93 
Brussels  to: 
lATA  SN  BQ  lATA  SN  BQ  lATA 
Madrid  14570  11230  5600 to  14500  8490  5600 to  14500 
9000  9000 
Vienna  16290  17790  5600 to  17790  6990  5600 to  17790 
9000  9000 
Rome  18730  9990  5600 to  20170  5600  5600 to  20170 
9000  9000 
Table  1 - Source:  REED database  (fares) 
As  Table  1 clearly  shows,  the  introduction of these  special  prices  has  had  the  effect 
of reducing the fares  charged by the national carrier,  in this  instance SABENA. 
2.  Observation of the market by routes 
a)  By  intra-Community routes 
Competition has  had little effect on the routes run as  a monopoly or a duopoly, which 
represent 94%  of intra-Community routes.  Since the introduction of the third package 
in 1993, fares have continued to rise on a large number of these routes, both in the case 
of the most flexible fares  (no-restriction business and economy fares)  and promotional 
economy fares  (PEX, APEX, etc.). 
On  the  other  hand,  on  routes  operated  by  more  than  two  carriers  (6%  of intra-
Community routes)  a number of initiatives designed to  increase market share  through 
fare reductions have been observed.  On the markets to and from the United Kingdom, 
British Midland has been one of the principal protagonists in the fares war, reducing its 
business  class  fares  by  10-20 % on the  London-Amsterdam/Paris/Brussels/Frankfurt 
routes over the 1992-1995 period.  Mention should also be made of the routes to and 
from Belgium operated by EuroBelgian. 
5 b)  By  domestic routes 
Compared with fares on international routes, domestic published fares (other than special 
offers) tend to be simpler in structure.  In addition, above all, prices arc lower relative 
to  distances,  as  a consequence among other things  of greater interrnodal  competition. 
The graph below (source:  REED, January  1996) shows that there is  still room for fare 
Air fares on selected domestic and intra Community 
routes with equivalent distances 
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Note: For city codes see list of abbreviations (Annex II) 
reductions  on the  international  routes,  all  the more so  as  a recent study published by 
American Express (New York Times,  20.12.95) indicates that the fares on international 
European routes arc roughly double those charged for comparable distances in the United 
States. 
On the domestic markets Europe has become divided up into open markets (sensitive to 
competition on fares)  and closed markets.  In the case of the open markets,  major fare 
wars were witnessed, especially in 1995, on the German market (DBA and Eurowings), 
the French market (with the arrival of AOM, Air Liberte and TAT), the Spanish market 
(Air Europa  and  Spanair)  and  the  Italian market  (with  Air One  on the  Rome-Milan 
route).  These arc four markets where the arrival of new carriers on certain routes has 
sparked .off considerable competition. 
In the closed markets we find Italy (with the exception of Rome-Milan),  Portugal and 
Finland, where the fares structures adhere to the conventional pattern and new entrants 
benefit the service to the detriment of prices.  L1stly,  Ireland, Austria, the Netherlands 
and Greece remain inflexible markets, in so far as all the domestic lines continue to be 
operated as  monopolies. 
6 c)  By  fifth freedom or cabotage routes 
These  routes  account  for  only  1%  of total  European  production,  and  it  is  therefore 
difficult  to  draw  meaningful  conclusions.  Nevertheless,  although  they  are  of little 
significance  in  terms  of European  output  as  a  whole,  fifth  freedom  and  cabotage 
operations allow a new type of competition on fares  (examples:  Alitalia, on its  French 
domestic routes (Lyon to Nantes and Toulouse), introduced a return fare more than 30% 
lower than that of Air Inter.  Conversely,  none of the fares  offered by Finnair,  which 
has developed a series of fifth freedom flights departing from Stockholm, arc any lower 
than those of its third and fourth freedom competitors. 
\ 
Conclusions 
Fares competition has  been characterized,  by and  large,  by  the  launching of new 
promotional and special fares  rather than reductions in existing fares. 
The proportion of passengers  travelling on scheduled flights  with cut-price tickets 
rose from 60.5%  in 1985 to 70.9% in 1995.  Allowing for the fact that the charter 
market accounts for some 50 to 55%  of the total market, it is reasonable to assume 
that 90 to 95%  of passengers are currently travelling at reduced fares. 
Such reductions as have occurred have not affected the most flexible fares.  On the 
contrary,  these fares  have even risen slightly,  notably on the duopoly routes,  i.e., 
on 93% of all intra-Community routes.  A detailed investigation clearly needs to be 
carried  out  in  order  to  identify  instances  of excessive  fares  in  the  context  of 
Regulation (EEC)  No 2409/92. 
Competition has not played any role except on (intra-Community or domestic) routes 
operated  by  more  than two  carriers.  Furthermore,  initiatives  aimed at  securing 
market share by reducing fares  have been confined to a few carriers only. 
Certain domestic markets (Italy (with the exception of Rome-Milan), Portugal and 
Finland,  Ireland,  Austria,  the  Netherlands  and Greece)  are  still  strangers  to  real 
competition, either because competition is confined solely to quality and service and 
not fares,  or because the domestic lines are operated as  monopolies. 
7 II  ACCESS TO THE MARKET 
The rules and their application 
- Inasmuch as  it establishes  the principle that Community air carriers  are free  to  provide services on 
intra-Community  air routes,  Article 3 of Regulation (EEC) No 2408/92 is  the cornerstone of the 
third package.  This freedom  brings to  an  end the  exchange-of-traffic-rights  arrangements  that had 
existed hitherto. 
- The Commission has received  many  requests  for  information and  interpretation concerning 
Regulation No 2408/92, as  we11  as  several complaints.  The Member States have  been closely 
involved in  examining  the latter through the Advisory Committee on Market  Entry set up under 
Article  11.  TI1e  Commission has therefore been required to take decisions on: 
the scope of the Regulation; 
authorization procedures  for traffic rights; 
safeguard clauses provided for in the Regulation. 
- Among the cases  that have been resolved,  mention may  be made  of the following:  the definitive 
national regulation in February  1996 a11owing  seat-only sales on non-scheduled  return flights to the 
Greek islands; the Commission reaffirmed,  pending the introduction of specific rules on the subject, 
that this practice was covered by the principle of free  market access;  as  regards public service 
obligations, more than  100 intra-Community  routes (in Ireland, Sweden,  Portugal,  the  United 
Kingdom and France) had been opened up under the new Regulation. 
- But the major areas  where Commission interpretations and decisions were required were Articles 5 
(exclusive concessions)  and  Article 8(1) (distribution of traffic within the same  airport system), with 
particular reference  to  the TAT case (Orly-Marseille and Orly-Toulouse) and access  to  the Orly-
London routes.  The provision of access  to Orly Airport has been particularly crucial  in ensuring the 
effective liberalization of the air transport market  in France to the extent that 85% of domestic traffic 
was handled by this airport.  The French authorities,  after appealing  to  the  C~urt of Justice, 
eventually accepted  the Community decision. 
Following the introduction of  complete freedom of access to the market, except for a few 
restrictions affecting cabotage until April 1997, it has finally been possible to break the 
duopoly  situation  resulting  from  the  bilateral  agreements,  both  with  respect  to  the 
scheduled  airlines  and  the  companies  previously  classified  as  charter  operators. 
Nevertheless, evidence is emerging that the new spirit of  competition, which benefits the 
consumer enormously,  may prove to  be a mixed blessing. 
1.  DeveloP-ment and comP-etition on the intra-Community ·routes 
Since 1992, while the number of intra-Community routes has increased somewhat, there 
has  been a  marked  drop  in the  number of routes  with  two  carriers,  both  relatively 
(compared with the total number of routes) and in absolute terms.  The number of routes 
(airport to  airport)  for  which more  than two  airlines  compete has  remained  limited, 
accounting for only 2%  of all the intra-Community routes operated at the beginning of 
1993 and 6%  at the beginning of 1996 (see  following table). 
8 lllfra-Community routes  (aimort trJ  aimorrt 
Jan.  1992  Jan.  1993  Jaq.  1994  Jan.  1995  Jan.  1996 
Total  510  488  482  522  518 
Monopoly  283  296  318  342  329 
(56%)  (61 %)  (66%)  (66%)  . (64%) 
2 carriers  208  182  150  154  158 
(40%)  (37%)  (31 %)  (29%)  (30%) 
More than 2 carriers  19  (4%)  10 (2 %)  14  (3%)  26 (5%)  31  (6%) 
(airport - airport) 
More than 2 carriers  28  20  22  39  38 
(city - city) 
Source: Reed data base. 
In contrast, operating frequencies on these same intra-Community routes have increased 
considerably,  and  it  will  be  noted  that  the  proportion  of flights  operated  on  intra-
Community routes with more than two carriers has risen from  12% at the beginning of 
1992 to  16%  at the beginning of 1996 with an even higher capacity share since all  the 
major  routes  are  included  such  as:  Hcathrow-Roissy,  Dublin-Heathrow,  Arlanda-
Copenhagen, Brussels-Rome,  Amsterdam-Heathrow, etc. 
While  it  is  true  that  there  has  been a  relative  increase  in  the  number  of monopoly-
operated routes, the majority of these routes arc still in low traffic-density sectors, which 
arc of little interest to  the big carriers and, as a result, offer a certain protection to new 
entrants. 
It should also be stressed  that a large number of these monopoly-operated routes have 
faced real competition not only from neighbouring routes but also from charter services 
or other modes of transport. 
2.  Development and competition on domestic routes 
It is  certainly on the domestic routes that competition has been most in evidence, albeit 
in varying degrees from one country to another, inspite  of the restrictions of article 3.4 
of the Regulation 2408/92 which arc applicable until the end  of 1996. 
Since the liberalization of market access, the traditional hiatus between, on the one hand, 
countries  where  even  prior  to  1993  a  multitude  of small  companies  have  existed 
alongside  the  major  carriers  and,  on the  other,  countries  where  the  national  carrier 
enjoys a quasi-monopoly,  is  tending to disappear. 
4 
Routes without intennediate touchdowns, from airport to airport, for which the capacity on offer is more than once a week 
and more than 100 seats a week.· 
9 Whereas at  the beginning of 1992 some 90% of domestic routes  were still  operated on 
a  monopoly  basis,  by  the  beginning of 1996  this  figure  had  dropped  to  80%.  The 
number of routes operated by two competitors or more almost doubled, going from 65 
in January  1993 to  114 in January  1994.  The biggest change occurred in  1995, mainly 
on the French, Spanish and German markets. 
Spain, for example, changed in the space of one year (1994) from a situation where all 
domestic flights were operated on a monopoly basis to a situation where 17  routes (i.e. 
almost 30% of the total) had been opened to competition.  Air Europa, Spanair and, to 
a lesser degree,  Air Nostrum were the main instigators of this change. 
In  France,  the  biggest  Community  domestic  market  with  more  than  20 million 
passengers,  the situation has changed radically in three years.  Between 1 January  1993 
and  1 January  1996  the  number of flights  increased  by  36%  on the  French domestic 
market, and the number of departures to the airports of Toulouse, Nantes and Mulhousc 
more  than  doubled.  TAT,  AOM,  Air  Littoral,  Euralair  and  Air  Libertc  were  the 
operators most actively involved. 
In Germany Lufthansa dominates a domestic market of around  15  million passengers. 
Of the 13  competitors no fewer than 6 arc new since the end of 1992.  Their activities 
arc still limited, however, on routes where there is  practically a monopoly.  In total,  a 
little more than 20% of domestic routes are not monopoly-operated. 
The number of domestic markets  where more than two carriers  are  active on certain 
routes increased from three in 1993 (United Kingdom, German, Portugal) to six in 1996 
(the same three plus Spain, France, Denmark). 
Lastly,  in  the  Netherlands,  Austria,  Ireland  and  Greece,  the  national  carrier  alone 
operates all domestic routes. 
5 
3.  Fifth freedom,  cabotage, seventh freedom 
Regulation  (EEC)  No 2408/92  abolished  all  restrictions  to  fifth  freedom  operating. 
Thus,  whereas as  at  1 January  1993  only  14  routes  were operated  with fifth freedom 
rights, by January  1996 no fewer than 30 intra-Community sectors, including  six routes 
operated on a  code-sharing  basis,  were on offer.  This change has  also  affected  the 
carriers,  inasmuch as,  now in 1996, all the major Community national carriers operate 
at least one fifth freedom link, whereas  in January 1993 only eight did so.  However, 
certain  carriers,  notably  Finnair,  Iberia,  Alitalia  and  Luxair,  have  been using  fifth 
freedom links more extensively.  Furthermore, it would appear that fifth freedom sectors 
are mainly operated by national carriers, with the exception of certain flights by Regional 
Airlines and Portugalia and, more recently, L1uda Air.  L1stly, it should be stressed that 
only four routes have been operated continuously by the same carrier between 1993 and 
1996, which can be explained by the fact that this kind of operation is  more expensive 
than direct services and is  also subject to greater operational constraints. 
With the exception, in Ireland, of a number of interregional services provided by Aer Arann with nine-seater planes, in 
Austria, of three  flights  provided by  Lauda Air and,  in  Greece, of the  brand new service by  Venus  Airlines between 
Athens and Thessalonika. 
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- 11  -The  fact  that  cabotage  is  still  subject  to  a  number of restrictions  provides  a  possible 
explanation why the Community carriers have used this  freedom only on a very limited 
scale.  Thus,  in  1992 three cabotage services were provided by three different airlines. 
As  at  1 January  1993,  18  different sectors were being operated on a cabotage basis by 
11  Community carriers,  including three  on a  code-sharing  basis.  Between  1993  and 
1995 nearly 20 sectors were operated in cabotage, only to be discontinued, generally not 
long after being  introduced.  By  January  1996 the  situation had  hardly changed,  with 
only 22 different sectors operated in cabotage (15  under their own codes and seven on 
a code-sharing basis).  With the exception of Aer Lingus, however, all the main carriers 
have been using cabotage services during the period under consideration.  Nevertheless, 
by the beginning of 1996, Lufthansa, SAS and Air France were no longer providing any 
service of this  type. 
The seventh freedom,  which is  the freedom to be established in and to operate from any 
Member State, has also been used on a moderate scale.  As examples, one could cite the 
two special experiments of DBA and TAT,  if operating under the BA code as used by 
these two carriers (and not under the code of the principal shareholder)  is considered to 
be seventh freedom.  While DAB continues to develop without major hitches, TAT has 
had  to  review  its  international  development.  These  two  airlines  have  developed 
international  links  on the  basis  of,  and  in parallel  with,  domestic  activities.  At the 
instigation of its  shareholder Lufthansa,  L1uda Air,  for  its  part,  switched some of its 
activities to Milan-Malpensa airport so as to provide a whole range of European services 
as from the summer of 1995.  However, this experiment has not. been continued.  L1stly, 
as  far  as  the  charter  companies  are  concerned,  TEA  was  the  first  to  relocate  its 
operations  by  setting  up  subsidiaries  in  Italy,  France,  the  United  Kingdom  and 
Switzerland  before  1993  in  anticipation  of the  future  liberalization  of the  European 
market.  Indeed,  it  is  the charter services  that have used  seventh freedom on a  really 
significant scale. 
4.  Under-car.acity routes with r.otential  for new entrants 
Between European capitals (sec map on next page), at the end of 1995, there were still: 
10 routes without any link; 
10 routes without a daily link; 
6 routes  without a direct link. 
This  state  of affairs  is  due  in  part to  the  fact  that  most  big  carriers  arc  engaged  in 
restructuring  and  rationalization  programmes  and  arc  concentrating  on  their  main 
operating bases  and  on certain routes  rather than diversifying.  With the  exception of 
Luxembourg, it is usually the capitals farthest away from the centre that arc affected by 
this  phenomenon.  On  the  other  hand,  all  these  capitals  arc  linked  via  "turntable" 
services (e.g., Copenhagen for SAS). 












,'  '  .----~--· 
,.\-' 
- 13  -In its CAP 654 report the British CAA estimated that, out of 33  intra-Community routes 
registering more than 250 000 passengers per year and still operating as  monopolies or 
duopolics,  15  could cope with increased competition and accommodate new entrants 
The report also identified 34 domestic routes in Europe operating at the end of 1994 on 
a monopoly or quasi-monopoly basis  which could justify additional competition. 
5.  Code-sharing 
The term  "code-sharing"  refers  to a form of commercial arrangement between two air 
carriers, whereby a carrier operating a certain service allows the other carrier to provide 
this same service under his own code or under a shared code.  On an international scale, 
more than 70% of alliances nowadays involve code-sharing arrangements.  This practice, 
developed in the United States,  has secured the transatlantic links and over the last few 
years  has  been  making  considerable  inroads  into  the  intra-Community  routes.  In 
proportion to their activities, at the beginning of 1993 Sabena and Air France were the 
biggest  users  of  this  formula  among  the  main  carriers  and  Eurowings  (NFD), 
Maersk UK,  Hamburg  Airlines  and  Lauda Air among  the  regional  carriers.  At the 
beginning of 1996 British Midland,  TAP,  Iberia,  Austrian and  Luxair were  the  most 
active operators in this sector.  For some companies, especially medium-sized or regional 
companies, code-sharing activities have grown to such an extent that at the beginning of 
1996 they accounted for the main bulk of their intra-Community operations.  Transwedc, 
Air Dolomiti,  L1uda Air,  Eurowings,  Portugalia  and  Air UK,  for  example,  were 
cooperating with other carriers using code-sharing formulas on more than 50% of their 
intra-Community flights  (more than 90%  for the  first three).  It is  also clear that since 
1993  these  agreements  arc no  longer limited to  a single partner,  at least as  far as the 
principal carriers arc concerned.  With the exception of Luxair and Olympic, they all 
have several different partners depending on the sector concerned.  Finally, code-sharing 
has  also  tended  to  develop  on  domestic  routes  and  British Midland  has  concluded 
agreements with a whole raft of European airlines whereby the latter attach their codes 
to domestic flights of British Midland out of London.  Furthermore,  BA has developed 
franchised code-sharing services with a large number of companies. 
14 Conclusions 
The monopoly-operated routes still account for 64% of all intra-Community routes. 
In addition,  the routes served by  more than two carriers have risen from 2% of all 
intra-Community routes  at the  beginning of 1993  to  6%  at the  beginning of 1996. 
It is  at the domestic level where the  impact of competition has  been more marked, 
in  that  the  number  of routes  operated  by  two  or  more  competitors  has  almost 
doubled, increasing from 65  in January  1993 to  114 in January  1996.  The greatest 
expansion has occurred on the French, Spanish and German markets. 
Although the number of fifth  freedom  routes  has doubled between 1993  and  1996 
from 14 to 30, this type of operation still retains its  secondary character. 
Under Regulation (EEC)  No 2408/92, the use of cabotage is  authorized only as  an 
extension of an international service up to 50% of the seasonal capacity on the initial 
service. 
Seventh freedom has  been used on a limited scale only. 
The Community market is  capable of sustaining  increased competition on both the 
intra-Community  and  the  domestic  routes.  This  has  been  supported  by  the 
Commission for example as  it.has been illustrated  in the crucial case of access of 
Orly airport. 
Reflecting  the  international  trend,  the  practice  of  code-sharing  has  evolved 
considerably on the Community market to the extent that, for some companies, this 
activity accounts for the bulk of their operations. 
15 III. DEVELOPMENT OF AIRLINES 
The rules and their application 
Regulation (EC)  No  2407/92 laid down rules on the issuing of the  Community licence.  Under these 
rules  the Member States have  issued  more than 800 licences  during the period under consideration. 
An extremely  limited number of these  licences  have been revoked,  mainly because of financial 
difficulties or bankruptcies. 
Discussions over these  three years have centred  basically  on the question of ownership and effective 
control.  This was clarified as  a result of the Swissair/Sabena case,  the general  aim being to protect 
the interests of the Community's air transport industry - until such time as  the Community airlines 
are permitted to  invest freely  abroad - by ensuring that  non-Community operators cannot unilaterally 
exploit the liberalized Community  market  by  means  of financial  holdings. 
As regards the question of leasing of aircraft,  the Commission has  reaffirmed  that,  at  this stage,  the 
authorization of leasing arrangements  under Regulation (EEC) No  2407/92 is  required solely for the 
purpose of ensuring compliance  with safety and liability standards.  Accordingly,  the national 
licensing authorities must not prevent air carriers from entering into leasing arrangements  for reasons 
other than ensuring safety and  liability (for example,  for aeropolitical  considerations). 
1.  General development of company capacity 
Capacity has  developed  to  a limited extent and,  in the case of scheduled services,  is 
mainly the result of the activity of small and  mediu~-sized enterprises and the arrival 
of some new entrants in certain markets.  In general,  output (expressed  in numbers of 
flights  or scats  available)  of virtually all airlines  increased  and  load  factors  improved 
because of renewed growth in traffic.  The breakdown of output between the different 




Breakdown of output on the European market 
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16 In tenns of the creation of companies,  some spectacular developments have occurred, 
so  much  so  that  the  number  of European  companies  operating  scheduled  services  in 
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Around 80 new businesses have been set up as  against 60 closures,  including a certain 
number of absorptions  (Air Vendee, Brymon) andre-absorptions (ATI,  Viva). 
With the exception of the UK, each of the Member States still has a sizeable share in its 
"national airline".  These companies have experienced a further  increase  in output in 
1995.  It should  be  noted,  however,  that  the total  market share  (domestic  and  intra-
Community) of the national carriers departing from each Member State has declined vis-
a-vis  their  direct  competitors.  Thus,  whereas  in  1993  the  principal  carriers  of 10 
countries  still  accounted  for  over three-quarters  of the  available  seats  in their  home 
market, by 1996 the decline in concentration is  such that only six countries are still in 
this  situation.  However,  while concentration is  declining,  there are still considerable 
differences between the national carriers and their nearest rivals.  Nevertheless,. the latter 
are making considerable advances in boosting their output. 
- 17-Output of the second  largest carrier in relation to  the  largest
9 
1990  1993  1996 
Ireland  Ryanair/  Aer Lingus  16  %  27  %  60% 
United  British Midland/British Airways
10  29  %  28%  24  % 
Kingdom 
Austria  L1uda Air/  Austrian  - 5%  28% 
Ponugal  Portugalia/T  AP  - 31  %  29% 
France  TAT/Air France (Air Inter)  6%  6%  12  % 
Belgium  EBA/Sabena  - - 6% 
Denmark  Maersk/SAS  2%  28  %  31  % 
Gennany  DBA/Lufthansa  - 8%  13% 
Italy  Meridiana/  Alitalia (ATI)  7%  14%  14  % 
Spain  Air Europa/Iberia (Aviaco)  - - 10% 
Netherlands  Transavia/KLM  6%  4%  6% 
Sweden  Transwede/SAS  - 2%  16  % 
2. Scheduled and non-scheduled airlines 
The third  package has  removed the  distinction between scheduled  and  non-scheduled 
services.  Henceforth, charter specialists can sell tickets to private  individuals at both 
ends of the route on a seat-only basis.  Furthermore, like scheduled airlines, they can set 
up in any European market.  Some of them have benefited from these new provisions 
to  enter the  scheduled  market  (Air Europa,  Spanair,  Air Liberte,  LTU,  etc.)  while 
retaining their purely charter activities in parallel. 
Despite these changes, the charter market has continued to grow in terms both of output 
and traffic.  In the case qf certain destinations such as Spain and Greece, charter traffic 
still accounts for more than 80%  of the total traffic (scheduled and non-scheduled). 
The  European  non-scheduled  market  involves  some 40  companies,  600 aircraft  and 
65  million passengers.  The United Kingdom, Germany and Spain operate 80%  of this 
traffic.  The charter airlines continue to  fall into two main groups:  those dependent on 
9 
Comparison based on the output for a week in January (Reed data base). 
10 
British Airways and the franchisees sharing its code. 
18 a  national  carrier  (Sobelair/Sabena,  Condor/Lufthansa,  etc.)  and  those  linked  to  or 
controlled by a major tour operator. 
3.  Alliances and partnerships 
In a world of global markets  and trade liberalization,  airlines have taken  to  thinking in  terms of 
cooperation,  alliances  and holdings.  The obvious objective  is  to  achieve  economies  of scale at  all 
levels,  by combining or developing joint activities,  but it is also seen as  a way of gaining access  to 
markets that are otherwise difficult to penetrate. 
Some agreements  are of a marketing  type and purely commercial.  Some tend  to  reflect a control 
strategy through the  acquisition of holdings, while others constitute a new approach:  franchising.  All 
have the generic name of alliances. 
These alliances  may  also be divided into two categories:  tactical  and strategic.  The tactical  or 
ad hoc alliances  focus  more particularly on a range of activities,  a joint marketing  technique (code-
sharing) or even a particular route,  while the strategic alliances generally cover a wide variety of 
activities  (marketing,  technical  aspects,  representation,  administration,  code-sharing,  etc.) and 
theoretically  have a long-term objective. 
While  it  is  true  that  these  alliances  are  not  a  direct  consequence  of air  transport 
liberalization in the Community, the provisions of the third package have nevertheless 
facilitated  this  type  of agreement.  From  59  alliances  in  1990  there  has  been  a 
progressive  increase to  138 in 1994 and 171  in 1995 (Airline Business,  June  1994 and 
June  1995). 
Although acquisitions of financial holdings were rare at the beginning of the  1990s, a 
number of companies were still able to  attract potential investors:  Tyrolean,  Brymon, 
Air UK,  Martinair,  Lauda Air and Business  Air.  Conversely,  Air France severed all 
links with Sabena (49.5% of whose capital has meanwhile been taken over by Swissair). 
Nevertheless, the trend remains one of link-ups and consolidation.  All the European flag 
carriers have subsidiaries  or more or less  sizeable holdings in other European or even 
non-European airlines.  These link-ups are motivated by a threefold strategy: 
Gaining  control  of  your  own  market  (Air  France/  Air  Inter,  British 
Airways/British Caledonian/Dan Air, Austrian/Tyro  lean) 
Getting established on another Community market (Lufthansa/Business Air/Lauda 
Air, British Airways/Deutsche BA/TAT). 
Seeking a more global alliance at world level (KLM/Northwest, Iberia/  Aerolineas 
Argentinas,  British Airways/US Air). 
19 In  many  cases,  alliances  without  financial  participation  arc  still  planned.  The  first 
important example in Europe dates from  1990:  the European Quality Alliance between 
SAS, Swissair and Austrian until 1991.  Since then, there have been alliances of a more 
global nature, as between Lufthansa and SAS (integration of frequent-flyer programmes, 
ground-handling services, development of code-sharing, etc.), under certain conditions 
imposed by the Commission (freeze on frequencies,  release of slots,  etc.).  It should be 
noted  that most of the alliances  not involving financial  participation have one thing  in 
common:  the development of code-sharing arrangements. 
With franchising, a new concept has emerged.  Five British carriers (City Flyer, Manx, 
GB  Airways,  Loganair,  Maersk)  now  fly  under the  British  Airways  code and  livery. 
Through these agreements,  British Airways'  partners are authorized to  usc the British 
Airways' logo (British Airways Express) and colours (uniforms, cabin furnishings, sales 
desks,  etc.) and certain services (control of cash receipts,  management of the frequent-
flyer  programme,  reservations,  etc.).  In exchange,  in  addition  to  a  fcc,  they  must 
undertake  to  respect  British  Airways'  standards  of service.  The  advantages of such 
cooperation are real for both parties.  The partners acquire a name and a system.  British 
Airways,  for  its part, develops  its  operations at zero cost on a wide variety of highly 
diversified routes and benefits from the feed-in of passengers  to  its  European or long-
haul services.  The concept also has advantages  for consumers,  since British Airways 
undertakes  to  deal  with and solve any  problems that may  arise  in the course of their 
journey, which is  not always the case where code-sharing only is  practised. 
4.  Airline traffic  . 
The AEA airlines have seen a steady growth in their traffic in geographical Europe since 
1992.  Overall traffic increased by 8.1% in 1994, the biggest rise for  15  years  leaving 
aside  the  9.1%  in  1992  following  the  drop  in  traffic  recorded  in  1991.  This  trend 
continued in 1995  with growth reaching 6.1 %,  and a new record of 8.3%  in terms of 
PCK for all the AEA airlines  taken together.  This fairly  sustained growth in traffic, 
coupled with a more  moderate  increase  in output,  was  reflected  in an improved  load 
factor for all the national carriers  which,  like the productivity improvements,  brought 
many of them back into  profit ability. 
After running a deficit for several years, most airlines managed to get back into the black 
in  1995.  Net  profits  for  the  12  main  Community  airlines  are  in  the  region  of 
US$ 800 million against a net overall loss  on the same scale in 1994.  However,  only 
British Airways, Finnair and KLM achieved universally favourable results over the entire 
period from 1990 to 1994.  Among the medium-sized and regional airlines which have 
been particularly active since the  introduction of the third package, good results  were 
achieved in 1995 by Regional Airlines and Air Littoral with net profits of FF 9 million 
and FF 8. 5 million respectively, by EBA (net profit of  BF 200 million) and by Tyrolean 
Airways (net profit of US$ 3 million). 
20 As  part of the  effort to  increase  productivity,  most  airlines  have  reorganized  and cut 
staff.  For example,  the  AEA  carriers,  which  are  the  main  companies  involved  in 
reducing  numbers,  shed 5 000 staff in  1994,  so  that the  total  number of employees  is 
now the same as  in  1986.  Together with traffic increases  and  improved output,  these 
staff cuts have had  the effect of improving productivity per person considerably. 
5.  Employment 
While there have been no dramatic disappearances among the more important carriers, 
the  Commission  is  conscious  of the  potential  implications  of the  liberalisation of air 
transport for employment in the sector. 
The creation of greater competition,  and  the  growth in  total  air  traffic  which this  is 
bringing about, should counterbalance to some extent the restructuring already underway 
among existing operators. 
Furthermore,  the  Commission  continues  to  consult  the  social  partners  in  the  Joint 
Committee on Civil Aviation on the measures to  implement air transport liberalisation 
and in this context, a study on the Social Impact of Liberalisation is  in progress. 
Conclusions 
- A large number of airlines have been set up since 1993 (some 80 new airlines were 
created while 60 disappeared). 
- In the case of scheduled traffic, the development of capacity (expressed in numbers 
of flights or seats available) has been mainly attributable to the activities of the small 
and medium-sized enterprises. 
- The share of the  national carriers  in  total output is  declining  compared  with their 
main direct  competitors (example: Ryanair's output is  already over half that of Aer 
Lingus). 
- The charter market is continuing to grow as  a result of the changes brought about by 
the third package.  In certain countries charter traffic may account for more than 80% 
of the total traffic. 
- In keeping with the international trend, alliances within the Community are continuing 
to develop. 
1995 stands out as  the year when most of the European scheduled airlines got back 
into the black thanks, among other things,  to  a sustained growth in traffic,  coupled 
with a moderate increase in output, which was reflected in improved load factors and 
increased  productivity.  It is  striking  to  observe  that  throughout the  same  period 
almost all the charter companies made a profit. 
21 IV.  OBSTACLES TO COMPETITION 
The third package has now been in place for three years.  However, despite the ensuing 
liberalization, the anticipated results have not been fully achieved.  Indeed, there are still 
a number of factors preventing the air transport market of the Europe of the Fifteen from 
achieving its  full  potential. 
- First and foremost, attention must be drawn to the problems linked to  infrastructures: 
airports  with limited capacity,  overcrowded  runways  and  time-slot problems.  An 
IAT  A  study  predicts  that  by  2005  European  passenger  traffic  will  double,  which 
means  that  there  will  be  about  600  million  additional  passengers  and  7  million 
additional landings and takeoffs.  In contrast, more than 10 European airports could 
well be operating below their actual capacity. 
- For years, airports and governments have restricted access to the market in ground-
handling services with the result that the national carrier,  one of its  subsidiaries  or 
sometimes an independent company has exercised a monopoly in these services.  The 
rates charged are frequently excessive,  if not prohibitive. 
- The absence of a common external policy leaves the internal air transport market in 
a fragile  state and at the  mercy of positions  acquired through bilateral agreements 
concluded between the Member States and third countries.  Because of the diversity 
of these agreements the Member States and their air carriers have to work with non-
harmonized systems and rules  in their dealings with non-member countries.  These 
rules  are  in  some  cases  even incompatible with the  internal  market  (e.g.  national 
designation  clauses,  obligatory  trade  agreements,  etc.).  Lastly,  the  open  sk.)' 
agreements concluded recently by certain Member States with the United States make 
no provision for any accompanying measures ensuring the proper functioning of this 
liberalized environment. 
- To these should be added a number of external factors, such as disparity in social and 
tax legislation or the environmental aspect to which some Member States attach more 
importance than others.  Historical factors,  such as situations resulting from bilateral 
agreements (designated national carriers, designated single national carriers) are also 
still  likely  to  favour  some  companies  (generating  intercontinental  traffic, 
recapitalization) and thus form an obstacle to competition. 
During  the  period  under consideration,  the  Commission  took action  on all  of these 
problems, and continues to do so,  in collaboration with the relevant organizations and 
authorities  with  the  aim  of  achieving  total  liberalization,  without  obstacles  or 
discrimination. 
22 Examples of this action include: 
- Council Regulation (EEC) No 3089/93 11  amending the code of  conduct for computerized 
reservation systems in accordance with the rules introduced by the third package; 
- publication at the beginning of 1996 of the White Paper on Freeing Europe's Airspace, 
which deals with the problems posed by the fragmentation of European airspace  into 
incompatible systems and the serious implications this has in terms of air traffic control; 
- Directive on the gradual liberalization of access t_o the ground-handling services market; 
- Council Regulation (EEC)  No 95/93 12 ,  adopted in January  1993, on the  allocation of 
slots; this is  now being revised and should be the subject of new Commission proposals 
during 1996; 
- efforts by the Commission,  in the context of the common external policy,  to obtain a 
Community mandate for negotiating air agreements with non-member countries;  in this 
context the Commission also intends shortly to submit its proposals to expand the scope 
of Council Regulations (EEC) 3975 and 3976/87. 
introduction by  the  Commission,  before  the  end  of 1996,  of a  proposal  on airport 
charges based on the three major principles of  non-discrimination, transparency and true 
reflection of costs. 
- In addition,  at the end of 1994 the Commission adopted strict rules  on state aid  and 
reiterated  the  principle  that state aid should be paid only once.  The  Commission's 
policy in this respect is  to permit airlines which benefit from such aid to  re-establish 
their viability while limiting as much as possible distortive effects on competition. In 
addition the Commission continuously monitors that conditions under which the aid was 
approved are respected. To this end in the case of restructuring aid the Commission will 
normally  request  that a  progress  report  on ,the  implementation of the  restructuring 
programme together with the respect of the conditions is submitted at regular intervals. 
11  OJ L 278 of 11.11.1993 
12 
OJ L 14 of22.1.1993 
23 - Finally,  the Commission continues  to  work on new  legislation  to  step  up  consumer 
protection,  quality of service  and  safety.  In this  connection,  the  National  Aviation 
Authorities,  combined  in  the  JAA,  have  also  worked  out  a  set  of technical  and 
operational conditions  (JARs)  which have  to  be  submitted  for  examination for  their 
incorporation in Community legislation on the basis of Regulation (EEC) 3922/91 13  so 
that the various national practices in this field may be harmonized.  In particular, this 
will  include provisions  to  harmonize the  implementation of Article  10 of Regulation 
(EEC) No 2407/92 on the leasing of aircraft. 
13 
OJL373of31.12.1991 
24 Selected Fully Flexible Air Fares in the EU 
Y fares for 100 - 500  Km  - July 1996 
Lowest Domestic  Highest Domestic 
ECU  ECUIKm  ECU 
Preveza-Athens  32  0.11  Limoges  - Lyon  188 
Alexandroupolis-Athens  46  0.12  Toulouse - Clermont-Ferrand  187 
Thessaloniki - Ioannina  25  0.12  Turku - Tampere  87 
Corfu - Athens  53  0.13  Lille- Metz  199 
Kavala - Athens  45  0.13  Eindhoven - Amsterdam  75 
LmYest International  Highest International 
ECU  ECUIKm  ECU 
Belfast - Cork  119 I 124  0.34 I 0.35  Brussels  - Luxemburg  166 
Exeter - Dublin  126 I 131  0.35 I 0.37  Mariehamn- Stockholm  112 I  115 
Cardiff - Dublin  108 I  113  0.36 I 0.38  Le Havre - Southampton  184 I  179 
Bristol - Paris  185 I 241  0.41 I 0.53  Luxembourg - Frankfurt  182 I  177 
London - Dusseldorf  197 I  0.41  Le Havre - London  255  I 210 
Source: OAG 
~ 









0.92 I 0.93 
0.89 I 0.96 
1.04 I  1.01 
1.42 I  1.17 
I 
)> 
z  z 
m 
X Selected Fully Flexible Air Fares in the EU 
C fares for 100 - 500 Km  - July 1996 
!  Lowest Domestic  Highest Domestic 
'  ! 
I  ECU  ECUIK.m  ECU  ECUIK.m 
1 
Thessaloniki - Athens  70  0.23  Frankfurt - Dusseldorf  149  0.79 
Oporto - Lisbon  74  0.28  Leipzig - Hamburg  246  0.82 
1  Paris - Bordeaux  138  0.28  Frankfurt - Munster  184  0.83 
' 
East Midlands - Aberdeen  156  0.32  Hamburg - Rostoch  131  0.86 
,  Munich - Berlin  158  0.33  Stuttgart - Frankfurt  138  0.89 
I  Lowest International  Highest International 
I  ECU  ECUIK.m  ECU  ECUIK.m  I 
London - Waterford  170 I  177  0.37 I 0.38  Hanover - Brussels  2911  0.73 I 
Bristol - Brussels  200 I  0.40  Leipzig - Copenhagen  387 I 361  0.83 I 0.77 
Cork - Birmingham  188 I  0.41  Bremen - Copenhagen  320 I 306  0.85 I 0.81 
London - Dusseldorf  197 I  0.41  Luxembourg - Frankfurt  157 I  148  0.90 I 0.85 
I  London - Amsterdam  1491  0.42  Ronneby - Copenhagen  221  I 218  1.25 I  1.23 
Source: OAG 
~~ 
All routes are operated at least on all weekdays. \;-1~ 
uJ~ 
Selected Fully Flexible Air Fares in the EU 
Y fares for over 500 Km  - July 1996 
------ ---- -----
Lowest Domestic 
ECU  ECU/Km 
Paris - Ajaccio  142  0.16  Mulhouse - Nantes 
Milano - Catania  165  0.16  Toulouse - Mulhouse 
Paris - Biarritz  142  0.16  Rennes - Lyon 
Paris - Calvi  142  0.17  Toulouse - Rennes 
Verona - Catania  165  0.17  Lyon - Le Havre 
Lowest International 
I  ECU  ECU/Km 
London - Helsinki  353  0.20  Hamburg - Strasburg 
London - Malaga  335  I 427  0.20 I 0.26  Munich - Nice 
London - Shannon  119 I  124  0.20 I 0.21  Luxemburg - Hamburg 
London  Lisbon  319  0.20  Paris - East Midlands  -
London - Faro  343  0.20  Stuttgart - Nice 
Source: OAG 
All routes are operated at least on all weekdays 
Highest Domestic 
ECU  ECU/Km  I 
262  0.39 
264  0.41 
251  0.44 
252  0.46 
260  0.47 
Highest International 
ECU  ECU/Km 
371  0.63 
399  0.63 
340 I 328  0.66 I 0.55  I 
. 
331  I 243  0.66 I 0.48 
404  0.70 Selected Fully Flexible Air Fares in the EU 
C fares for over 500 Km  - July 1996 
---
Lowest Domestic  Highest Domestic 
-I 
ECU  ECUIKm  ECU  ECUIKm 
Canary Islands - Barcelona  178  0.08  Friederichshafen - Berlin  258  0.42 
Marseille - Paris  146  0.22  Stuttgart - Hamburg  237  0.43 
Genova - Cagliari  134  0.23  Saarbriicken - Dresden  223  0.43 
Paris -Nice  167  0.25  Stuttgart - Berlin  224  0.43 
London - Belfast  136  0.25  Saarbriicken - Hamburg  249  0.47 
Lowest International  Highest International 
ECU  ECUIKm  ECU  ECUIKm 
London - Palma Majorca  150 I  155  0.1110.11  Niirnberg - Paris  377  0.61 
Manchester -Palma Majorca  180 I  186  0.111 0.12  Strassburg - Vienna  395  0.61 
London - Athens  434 I 574  0.18 I 0.24  Luxemburg - Hamburg  330 I 284  0.63 I 0.55 
East Midlands - Malaga  343  I 384  0.19 I 0.25  Paris - East Midlands  331  I 235  0.66 I 0.47 
London - Helsinki  353  0.20  Stuttgart - Nice  404  0.70 
Source: OAG 
~§; 
























List of abbreviations 
Stockholm - Gothenburg 
Stockholm - Oslo 
Madrid - Malaga 
Madrid - Oporto 
London - Newcastle 
London - Dublin 
Frankfurt - Hamburg 
Frankfurt - Paris 
Helsinki - Kokkola 
Helsinki - Stockholm 
Paris - Bordeaux 
Paris - Amsterdam 
Venice - Rome 
Venice - Strasbourg 
Air Traffic Management 
Joint Aviation Authorities 
Joint Aviation Regulations 
ANNEX  II 
International Air Transport Association 
Advanced purchased excursion ticket 
Purchased excursion ticket 
Association of European Airlines 
Civil Aviation Authority,  UK 
Association  des  Compagnies  Aeriennes  de  Ia 
Communaute Europeenne 
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